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ON THE USE OF PRACTITIONER SURVEYS
IN COMMERCIAL LAW RESEARCH
Comments on Daniel Keating's
'Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action'
Avery Wiener Katz*
As Daniel Keating's principal article attests, the literature on
U.C.C. section 2-207 and the "battle of the forms" is both vast and in
tricate.1 That fact, together with the distinguished array of commenta
tors assembled here, makes it unlikely that I will be able to say any
thing substantially original on that subject. Accordingly, in the spirit
of this overall symposium, I will focus the bulk of my remarks not on
the substantive issues raised by Keating's article, but on his methodol
ogy. In particular, I will suggest that Keating's empirical method the free-form, oral interview conducted personally by the principal re
searcher - is less reliable, and more vulnerable to distortion by the
biases of the interviewer and respondent, than he acknowledges.
While Keating is correct that this "hands-on" method can yield sub
stantial insight and unearth information that could not be found
through structured surveys or review of written company records, the
information thus generated is not subject to the usual controls pro
vided by those more conventional methods. Absent such controls, the
information is much more likely to be used to confirm the inter
viewer's or respondent's prior beliefs than to disconfirm them, or to
corroborate conventional wisdom rather than debunk it. Thus, I
would take his findings - that commercial actors have adjusted fairly
well to the use of standard form contracts, that the battle of the forms
is relatively uncommon in practice, and that significant statutory re
form is not in order - with skepticism, at least until they have been
confirmed by a more traditional empirical study that makes greater
use of tabulated quantitative data and that takes greater precautions
to screen out interpretative bias.

* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law (avkatz@law.columbia.edu). I
am grateful to Lisa Bernstein and Clay Gillette for helpful discussions, to Daniel Keating for
generously sharing his survey results, and to Ronald Mann and the editors of the University
of Michigan Law Review for organizing the Symposium on Empirical Research in Commer·
cial Transactions for which these comments were prepared.
1. Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2678,
2683·92 (2000) (summarizing and critiquing scholarly literature on the battle of the forms),
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Unstructured Interviews and Secondhand Narrative:
The Pitfalls ofImpressionist Methodology

Although the drawbacks of free-form interviews are well known,
and although Professor Keating briefly mentions some of them in his
article, it is worth restating them here a little more fully, if only to
counterbalance the short shrift he gives them. To begin rather ab
stractly, it is a truism of modern accounts of scientific method that em
pirical data do not exist in a vacuum, separate from any theoretical
framework. The world is not simply waiting out there to be observed;
instead, it must be put in order. An empirical researcher therefore
must choose among the various features of a complex reality, selecting
some to notice and record, while ignoring countless others. Which as
pects of the world are salient - which are worth noticing
will nec
essarily depend on the theoretical lens of the observer. Similarly, the
process of interpreting and summarizing data is also influenced by
one's theoretical framework.
Keating's unedited interview transcripts, for example, consist of
approximately 280 pages in WordPerfect electronic format. His sum
mary of these interviews takes up approximately twenty-three pages of
his final article, nine of which describe his respondents' reactions to
various proposals for statutory reform. In condensing this large body
of interview material down to a coherent narrative, Keating necessar
ily had to suppress the bulk of the information it contained. In
choosing what information to suppress and what to accentuate, he was
necessarily motivated by his pre-existing views of what counted as sig
nal and what as noise. A different researcher with different theoreti
cal preconceptions might have made quite different choices.
As I have said, these observations are commonplace ones; and
Keating does refer to them before launching into his main narrative.2
In my view, however, he does not sufficiently recognize their force.
He does not cite any of the standard texts on survey research methods,
for instance, or indicate that those texts generally disapprove the sort
of unstructured interviews that he undertakes.3 Nor does Keating rec
ognize how the potential for interpretative bias, which threatens gen
erally to infect all empirical studies, was exacerbated by several spe
cific features of his particular methodological approach.
Before elaborating on these specific features, though, let me point
out just one instance of the bias that can be introduced through the in-

2. See id. at2697,
3, For general discussions of survey research methodology, see EARL BABBIE, SURVEY
ed. 1990); and FLOYD J, FOWLER, JR., SURVEY REsEARCH
Both texts emphasize throughout their discussions the impor·
tance of standardized question design and interview scripts in producing reliable results and
minimizing interviewer bias. See, e.g., Babbie, supra, at 144, 192-93; Fowler, supra, at 5-6, 70·
72, 107-18.
REsEARCH METHODS (2d
METHODS ( rev. ed. 1988).

2762

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:2760

terview method, just to illustrate the risks that are involved. In focus
ing on this example, I don't intend to claim that it is randomly chosen
or that I am immune from any of the methodological problems that I
have just described. On the contrary, the example was particularly sa
lient to me because it stems from a theoretical claim that I regard as
mistaken and have argued against in prior writings.4 But the example
is still telling, I think, because it illustrates concretely how a re
searcher's theoretical preconceptions can enter into - and subtly bias
- a good faith attempt at empirical description.
The example that jumped out at me from Keating's article is an old
and familiar claim within the literature on standard form contracts. It
is, in short, that the use of standard forms and resistance to negotiating
over them has something to do with market power - or as Keating
calls it, leverage. Keating, like many influential writers before him, as
sumes that large and powerful market actors will want to use standard
forms, and to present those forms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, in or
der to maximize their profits from exchange at the presumed expense
of their contractual partners.5 This claim doesn't play a central role in
his article, but he does refer to it at several points in his discussion and
reports that his respondents believe it to be true.6 Further, at the end
of his article, he devotes an entire paragraph to this claim and identi
fies it as the factor that is likely to have the single most significant ef
fect on the battle of the forms in the future.7
The reason why this claim stood out for me is that it is inconsistent
with the standard economic account of how firms with market power
maximize profits. While it is true that the users of form contracts are
often unwilling to do business on terms other than their standard ones,
this is not a function of monopoly. Standardization of contracts, like
other forms of mass production, lowers the cost of individual transac
tions, thus giving competitive firms as well as monopolists an incentive
to use it. The notion that a monopolist would want to offer lower
quality or more self-serving contract terms than a competitive firm de
pends upon a mistaken analogy between quantity and quality. Specifi
cally, a monopolist finds it profitable to produce an inefficiently low

4. See Avery Wiener Katz, Standard Form Contracts, in 3 THE NEW PALORAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman, ed., 1998).
5. The claim is most famously made by Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); later influential
reformulations of the claim include Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1983); and W. David Slawson, Standard Form Con
tracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971). The no
tion that "adhesion contracts" are motivated by monopoly or market power is also promi
nently featured in judicial condemnation of form contract terms. See, e.g., Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
6. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2702, 2707, 2709, 2714.
7. See id. at 2714.
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quantity of goods because that forces consumers to compete against
each other for the reduced supply, thus bidding up the price.
If the monopolist seller tried to reduce the quality of its contract
terms, in contrast, it would lower the value of its product to its buyers,
reducing the markup it could profitably charge. Similarly, if a monop
oly buyer {often called a monopsonist) reduced the quality of its con
tract terms, it would raise its suppliers' costs and thus reduce the pos
sible discount it could obtain from them. For this reason, a profit
seeking monopolist generally will make the most of its market power
by choosing a level of quality and service that best suits the prefer
ences of its marginal customers and suppliers, for to do otherwise sac
rifices profits. If it is worth more to the customer or supplier to have
its own standard terms than it is to the monopolist, then the monopo
list does better to yield on contract terms and take its profits out in the
price.8
To be precise, I am not disputing that larger firms might be less
willing to yield on standard form terms than smaller firms. This would
be the case if (and only if) the larger firms faced an increased cost in
changing their terms, perhaps because they had larger bureaucracies,
because they had adopted fixed methods of mass production that were
more costly to change, or because their larger volume of transactions
allowed them to develop reputations for quality or reliability that sub
stitute for legal protections. But, in this case, the reason for their resis
tance would not be monopoly power or leverage, but efficiency.
This disparity between standard economic theory and the results
reported by Keating prompted me to look more closely at the evi
dence supporting the claim, which Keating attributed to his respon
dents, that reluctance to negotiate over contract terms was related to
leverage. In doing so, I was assisted by Keating's having generously
made available to me an electronic copy of his interview transcripts.9
While it would have been impractical manually to search through the

8. See William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the
New Antitmst Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1985) (legally oriented exposition, focusing on
product quality); Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs ofLegal Rules: Efficiency and Dis
tribution in Buyer-seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991) (generalizing the analysis
of product quality to contractual terms generally); A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality,
and Regulation, 6 BELL J. ECON. 407 (1975) (formal demonstration of this result using
mathematical economics). More precisely, if all its customers or suppliers have the same
willingness to pay for contract terms, the monopolist will do best to provide a contract with
optimal terms and to extract all available profits through the price. Only if the tastes of the
marginal customer or supplier are unrepresentative of the general population of contracting
parties will suboptimal terms be offered. For example, if willingness to pay for a warranty is
positively correlated with willingness to pay for the underlying good, then the monopolist
will offer a suboptimal warranty (because then the amount that the marginal customer is
willing to pay for a better warranty is less than the amount that the non-marginal customers
would pay).
9. Keating Interview Transcripts (1999) (document on file with the Michigan Law Re
view).
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full 280 pages for any reference to this claim, I was able to do a com
puter search, and find every instance in the interviews that specific
words related to the claim appeared. I did this for the words "lever
age," "monopoly," and "power;" and in all found thirteen interviews
in which these words appeared in the context of the market power
claim.10 I then looked specifically at each such instance to see whether
the word or words, or the concept of leverage itself, was first intro
duced into the interview by Keating, or by his respondent - a process
which was in most cases straightforward, but in one or two instances
required me to read the discussion in context and exercise judgment.
Again, my motivation for conducting this exercise was that I regarded
the leverage claim as theoretically doubtful, and so I wanted to see
whether this claim was truly attributable to Keating's respondents, as
he had reported, or whether instead it arose, partly or fully, out of his
own theoretical framework.
The result of my exercise was that, out of thirteen interviews in
which leverage was mentioned, Keating introduced the concept in
eight of them.11 In four cases, the respondent introduced the concept.12
And in one case, I judged that the introduction of the concept was
equally attributable to both parties.13 In sum, Keating suggested the
concept of leverage to his respondents roughly twice as often as his re
spondents suggested it to him.
I should reiterate that my review of the interview transcripts was
quite limited, and I am not claiming that Keating generally supplied
his respondents with theoretical interpretations or systematically put
words in their mouths. Rather, I examined a single issue, the selection
of which was motivated by my own theoretical preconceptions that the
attributed claim was likely to be unreliable as a description of reality,
and found, confirming my preconceptions, that Keating influenced it
on a majority of occasions. I did not check any of the other claims he
described in his article, or subject them to a similar test. Thus, the in
formation my exercise revealed is at most anecdotal. In my view,
though, it does illustrate, however symbolically, the potential for bias
present in Keating's interview method.

10. See id. These were Interview 3 (dated Nov. 9, 1999), Interview 7 (dated Nov. 12,
1999), Interview 8 (dated Nov. 12, 1999), Interview 12 (dated Nov. 15, 1999), Interview 13
(dated Nov. 22, 1999), Interview 16 (dated Feb. 8, 2000), Interview 17 (dated Nov. 30, 1999),
Interview 19 (dated Nov. 30, 1999), Interview 20 (dated Nov. 30, 1999), Interview 21 (dated
Dec. 1, 1999), Interview 22 (dated Dec. 1, 1999), Interview 24 (dated Dec. 3, 1999), and In
terview 25 (dated Dec. 6, 1999). The word, "power," appeared on a few occasions in the
context of electric power, but I excluded these references from my count.
11.
12.

See id.
See id.

(Interviews 3, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 24, and 25.).
(Interviews 7, 8, 21, and 22.).

13. See id. (Interview 16, involving the single respondent whose name was supplied, one
Tatelbaum.).
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Let me now return to that method and elaborate more fully on the
features that make it, in my view, particularly susceptible to the prob
lems I have identified. The first such feature is of course Keating's
free-form conversational format, with its resultant lack of control over
the wording, order, and emphasis of questions. The problem here is
not just that the lack of structure makes it easier for the researcher (or
the respondent, for that matter) unconsciously to guide the conversa
tion toward conclusions that are theoretically congenial. The real dif
ficulty, rather, is that the lack of comparability between interviews
makes it impossible for outside observers to check for signs of such
bias without reviewing the full set of interview transcripts. Inspecting
the interview script is not an adequate substitute for such a thorough
going review, since that script is a mere skeleton of the subsequent
performance to which it gives rise. As a designated commentator on
Keating's article, I happened to have an electronic copy of the tran
scripts, which allowed me to develop the anecdote outlined above.
But I did not review the transcripts in any systematic way, nor would it
have been feasible for me to do so in the limited time that I had to
prepare my remarks. The larger symposium audience did not have
practical access to the transcripts at all; neither will the readership of
this journal, unless Keating is generous enough to make an electronic
copy available to anyone who wishes to see one, as he was with me.
A second and similar feature that makes Keating's interview
method susceptible to bias is that the differences among Keating's in
terviews, together with his small sample size, mean that the data he
collected must be summarized in narrative rather than quantitative
form, and described impressionistically rather than systematically.
The problem here is not just sample bias and lack of statistical signifi
cance, as Keating would have it. Rather, it is that the information he
lays out may not accurately reflect the sample on. which it is based;
and, more importantly, that there is no realistic way for his audience to
check its accuracy or consider alternative interpretations. If he had
asked a more controlled set of questions, he could have presented a
full set of summary statistics in quantitative and tabular format. His
audience could then be confident that it received a systematic sum
mary of the interviews, rather than just an account of the information
that the author personally found salient. Readers would then be able
to inspect such statistics on their own, and could look for patterns that
the author had not noticed or that were based on their own theoretical
frameworks rather than the author's. With an impressionistic narra
tive, in contrast, the audience can still deconstruct the author's text
and look for counterexamples, as I did with my symbolic illustration,
but its ability to re-run and re-interpret the data is substantially more
limited.
Third, the questions that Keating asked were particularly open
ended and thus subject to an additional level of interpretative bias on
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the part of his respondents. Keating did not, like Ronald Mann's con
tribution to this Symposium on the subject of letters of credit, attempt
to develop a random sample of actual transactions.14 He did not, like
John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff in their study of private or
dering in post-socialist transition economies, ask his respondents to
comment on specific individual transactions, such as the first or most
recent form contract with which they had dealt.15 Instead, he asked his
respondents to characterize their usual manner of doing business, or
their general practices as they saw them. To answer such questions,
Keating's subjects had to operate as theorists themselves; they had to
consult a large body of empirical experience, decide which aspects of it
were worth reporting, and then distill these selected aspects down to a
narrative description, which they then supplied to Keating as his raw
data. Accordingly, their reports were necessarily influenced by their
own theoretical frameworks, and by the institutional positions that
they occupied within their respective organizations. Thus, it is perhaps
not so surprising that a survey population of in-house contract lawyers
would report that they spent a significant amount of time reviewing
other companies' forms, or that they regularly avoid the battle of the
forms by negotiating all the important terms of their contracts up
front. These are the sorts of tasks that in-house lawyers are paid to
undertake - or that they think they are paid to undertake - and it
would instead be remarkable to find the lawyers admitting that they
fail to accomplish such tasks, or that they leave them to be addressed
by other organizational actors such as sales and purchasing agents.
Indeed, if Keating had asked the same questions to a population of
sales or purchasing agents, he might have received a set of rather dif
ferent answers.
Again, more important than the potential for self-serving or ideo
logical bias in his respondents' answers is the fact that Keating's survey
design did not allow him to check for such bias himself, if and when it
occurred. Because Keating did not have access to the larger body of
information on which his respondents based their answers, he could
not perform his own search for empirical patterns that the respondents
did not notice. Because he did not pin his respondents down to spe
cific transactions, he could not be assured that the events they de
scribed, whether anecdotes or generalizations, accurately reflected the
universe of their experience or the statistical frequency of such events
in that universe. Because he did not consider, and did not ask, ques
tions designed to uncover the overall theoretical framework with
which his respondents approached the empirical world, he was not in a

14. Ronald Mann,
REV. 2494 (2000).

The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions,

15. John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff,
98 MICH. L. REV. 2421 (2000).

Public Ordering,

98 MICH. L.

Private Ordering Under Dysfunctional
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position to discount or decode their answers in light of interpretative
perspective.
For these reasons, the parts of the interviews in which Keating
asked his respondents their opinion of particular statutory reforms,
and the section of his article in which he reports on those opinions,
seem to me particularly unreliable. Such opinions - about how com
mercial behavior would change under a different set of legal con
straints - are necessarily theoretical. Or more precisely, they are
based on the respondents' experiences under current legal and com
mercial institutions, together with their theoretical models of how the
world works. There is little reason to think that such experiences are
representative of the experiences they would have under other legal
regimes, or that the process through which the respondents achieved
positions of responsibility selected for success in evaluating proposed
legal regimes that never existed and that they likely heard about for
the first time in the course of Keating's interviews. Additionally, the
respondents' views about how they would react to a change in the law
reflects their assumptions regarding how other actors and institutions
would react to the change - for example, if other companies re
drafted their forms or changed their negotiation practices. But how
these other actors and institutions would react depend on how the re
spondents would react and so on, so that the ultimate result would de
pend on the accumulated effect of a host of strategically interacting
factors. There is nothing in Keating's account that suggests that either
he or his respondents undertook a systematic strategic analysis of such
factors.16 Thus, his survey probably says more about his theoretical
world view and those of his respondents than anything that would ac
tually happen if such proposals were undertaken.17
Thus, to recapitulate my objections, Keating's methodology al
lowed for the conflation of empirical data with theoretical framework
not once but twice - first when his respondents summarized their ex
periences for him and supplied him with the accounts that are found in
the interview transcripts, and second when he summarized his experi
ences of those interviews and supplied his audience with the account
that is found in his article. At both levels, the usual mechanisms for
guarding against and checking for interpretative bias were absent.

16. Consider, for example, the lawyer who favored Victor Goldberg's proposed "best
shot" rule, under which a court would choose whichever of the two forms is closest to the
court's favored central position, then because he or she would not need to draft forms spe
cific to each transaction. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2710. This simple response, however,
is not the best strategy to follow in a world of heterogeneous contracting parties who vary in
the terms they propose. When dealing with a partner who proposed very one-sided terms, it
would be optimal to propose terms that are almost as self-serving, but slightly less so, just
enough to win the court's favor. Against a more moderate partner, however, it would be
optimal to propose more moderate terms.
17. Consider, for example, the lawyer who favored Victor Goldberg's "best shot" pro
posal because he was "a big fan of final offer arbitration." Id.
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Both Keating and his subjects reported their experiences impressionis
tically, in a manner that left ample discretion to the reporter. There
was no attempt at either level to obtain a random sample of empirical
events, or to summarize the events that were reported in quantitative
or other systematic fashion, so that the audience (Keating for his re
spondents, and us for Keating) could reasonably look to see whether
the reports constituted a fair sample or displayed alternate patterns.
Finally, the interactive nature of the interviews, in which both Keating
and his respondents participated extemporaneously, makes it difficult
- and impossible without a full review of the transcripts - to tell
whether any interpretative bias found in the interviews derives from
Keating's theoretical framework, from those of his respondents, or
from a combination thereof. Thus, there is no straightforward way for
us to discount or translate his subjective narrative into a more neutral
or interpersonally reproducible version.
I don't mean by my comments to discourage further empirical sur
veys of the sort that Keating, at great effort and initiative, has under
taken. I agree with him that we need to supplement our theoretical
models with information from the real world and with the views of
nonacademics. In doing so, however, we should realize that distin
guishing our theories from the facts is not a straightforward matter,
that it is essential to build safeguards and checking mechanisms into
our empirical techniques to guard against interpretative bias, and that
the standard methods of survey and statistical research are standard
for the very reason that they do provide such safeguards when applied
properly and with judgment by the scholarly community.
Thus, in designing future surveys or interviews, it will be important
to try to limit the opportunity for the respondents to edit their experi
ences or to impose on them their own interpersonally inaccessible in
terpretative frameworks. It will be important to present the results of
such surveys in as systematic a manner as possible, in a form that al
lows the audience to double-check the data and test it against its own
theoretical conceptions. And, in cases where the raw data is not ame
nable to quantitative summary, the most useful safeguard might be to
be open and generous in making it available for detailed review, as
Keating was with me. Free-form interviews of the sort that Keating
conducted may have a legitimate role in the initial stages of a research
project when data collection is being planned and survey questions are
being designed. But they are not well suited for the final stages of a
project or for drawing conclusions, even in the tentative fashion and
with the sort of qualifications that Keating offers here.

Use of Practitioner Surveys
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An Afterthought: The Battle of the Forms from
an Organizational Perspective

I indicated at the outset of these comments that I would concen
trate my remarks on methodological issues, but before concluding, I
cannot resist offering just one theoretical observation on the substan
tive topic of the battle of the forms. My observation is that the battle
of the forms cannot be understood without reference to the problems
of agency costs and organizational incentives. More specifically, form
contracts are commonly used by one set of organizational actors to
disable other actors from binding the organization on terms that might
be in the latter actors' interests, but that the former actors do not wish
to assume. Merger clauses, for example, which bar any promise or
representation that does not explicitly appear in the written integra
tion of the agreement, are commonly used for the specific purpose of
taking contracting power away from the sales and purchasing agents
who orally represent the organization in its dealings with outsiders,
and to consolidate that power in the managers and legal professionals
who control the official texts of company documents.18
This agency-control function, while well recognized in the scholarly
literature on form contracts generally, has somehow failed to have an
impact on the scholarly literature on the battle of the forms. All the
commentators discussed in Keating's article, as well as Keating himself
in the bulk of his discussion, talk about commercial organizations as if
they are unitary rational actors that decide whether to use standard
forms and whether to read the forms supplied by their contractual
partners based on the overall interests of the organization. But this
assumption plainly fails to comport with actual practice. Commercial
form contracts are drafted by lawyers, and administered by purchasing
and sales agents whose compensation structure provides them with in
centives that are not identical to (or even proportional to) the benefits
and costs to the firm that employs them. Thus, when a company law
yer adds a term to a standard form, or a purchasing agent makes the
decision not to forward a customer's form to the in-house legal de
partment, there is no guarantee that either decision is in the overall interests of the firm
The battle of the forms, then, should be understood not just as a
strategic struggle between rival organizations, but also as part of a
·

.

18. See, e.g., Kevin Davis, Licensing Lies: Merger Clauses, the Parol Evidence Rule and
Pre-contractual Misrepresentations, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 485 (1999) (arguing that in the inter
ests of minimizing agency costs, sophisticated commercial parties should be allowed to dis
claim liability for their agents' pre-contractual and extra-contractual representations,
whether fraudulent or not); Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning
Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1998) (sug
gesting that rational firms consider the costs of shirking by agents when adopting merger
clauses).
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strategic struggle among rival agents within organizations. Indeed,
Keating's survey data attests to such a struggle, as when he tellingly
recounts the belief of "more than one in-house lawyer" that "if they
have taught their business people anything, it is never to actually sign
the other side's form without first reading it and consulting the law
department."19 The sales and purchasing agents who are the recipients
of such advice, however, presumably see this contest from a different
perspective, and if Keating had interviewed a significant number of
such nonlegal agents, instead of focusing his study solely on in-house
counsel, he might have heard more stories about how the lawyers mis
understand the business end of contractual transactions and more an
ecdotes about how the sales or purchasing department managed to
evade the formalistic procedures that the legal department had unsuc
cessfully attempted to impose.
I would conjecture that the use of one-sided terms in standard
forms, and the frequency and depth with which organizational actors
read the forms of other firms, will be closely connected with the qual
ity of the incentive structures that an organization offers its agents.
On this conjecture, firms that have relatively well-functioning incen
tive structures in place, so that the interests of in-house lawyers and of
purchasing and sales agents are well aligned, will tend to use fewer
one-sided terms in their own forms and will tend to communicate
more thoroughly within the firm regarding the content of outside
forms. In contrast, firms in which the legal and nonlegal departments
are at war will use more one-sided terms in their forms - drafted by
lawyers as a precaution against the purchasing and sales agents' failure
to pass along outside forms or to report questionable terms - and will
accordingly have poorer information regarding the content of outside
forms, as the purchasing and sales agents react to the lawyers' antici
pated interference by cutting them out of the informational loop. In
order to test this conjecture, however, it would be necessary to design
a survey that interviewed agents from various organizational depart
ments, and that focused on agency problems and organizational con
flict.
More speculatively, a study that focused on agency problems might
also have the potential to shed light on the claim, which Keating raised
in his article and I spent some effort above to debunk, that refusal to
bargain over contract terms is somehow related to market power or
leverage. As I indicated above, this claim is unpersuasive if we view
monopolists as rational profit-maximizing actors; but it has been fre
quently put forward and is widely believed among non-economists;
there might be something to it after all. If we recognize the role of
agency costs in contractual negotiation, however, the claim becomes
19. Keating, supra note 1, at 2704. (See also his discussion, id. at 2710, of the differing
perspectives of lawyers and business people.)
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more comprehensible. For even if an ideally maximizing monopolist
would prefer to take its profits in the form of a more favorable price, a
real firm operated by imperfectly motivated agents might not. The
agents do not enjoy the full benefits of the favorable price, and will be
tempted to shirk their duties in various ways: to reduce effort, take
kickbacks, and the like. It is not implausible in such a setting that
shirking could take the form of the unauthorized exercise of power
over contractual partners. Many people enjoy exercising power and
bending others to their will; and the pleasures of such actions may well
be greater for individuals whose subordinate role in a bureaucracy
puts them in the regular position of taking rather than giving orders.
As a concrete illustration of this phenomenon (and as one last illus
tration of the phenomenon whereby the salience of empirical experi
ence interacts with one's theoretical world view), in traveling to this
symposium my family and I needed to rebook our flight. The ticketing
agent with whom we dealt likely had the opportunity to exercise her
discretion in a way that minimized our inconvenience and expense.
This would have entailed some cost to the airline that employed her,
but would have bought the airline some amount of goodwill that might
have translated at a future time into increased business. Yet, because
the ticket agent was unlikely to share in the profits generated by this
future business, because any trouble she went to in order to accom
modate us was unlikely to be recognized or compensated, and because
any psychic benefits that she might enjoy from exercising petty
authority over us did not have to be shared with her employer, her in
centives to exercise discretion on our behalf were not perfectly aligned
with the interests of the airline. It may be that the ultimate result,
which was not in our favor, was one that the airline would have cho
sen, but it is likely for the above reasons that she was marginally less
accommodating than it or its stockholders would have ideally wished.
The fact that the airline in question had a virtual monopoly posi
tion on the airport hub through which we were flying, furthermore,
was not unrelated to the ticketing agent's incentive problem. Market
power, together with the supernormal returns it makes possible, cre
ates organizational slack, in that the firm can tolerate a larger degree
of internal inefficiency without suffering losses, attracting competition,
or drawing the attention of distant or scattered owners.20 Such slack
provides increased opportunities for shirking of various sorts, includ
ing the unprofitable exercise of power over customers and other con
tractual partners of the•firm. Firms that do not earn monopoly profits,
conversely, have less leeway to absorb or conceal the costs of such be
havior, and other things being equal, will be less likely to suffer it

20. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988), at 75-76
(explaining the connection between market power and organizational slack in terms of
asymmetric information between owners and managers).
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without changing th�ir organizational practices. If my anecdote is rep
resentative of a widespread phenomenon, accordingly, it could go a
substantial way toward explaining the widely asserted connection be
tween monopoly power and the use of adhesion contracts.

